



JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(U//FOUO) Wichita-Based Homegrown Violent Extremist Arrested for Attempted Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction at a Wichita Area Airport

13 December 2013

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on the 13 December 2013 arrest of Wichita-based Terry Lee Loewen^{USPER}. Loewen was arrested by the FBI Wichita Joint Terrorism Task Force and charged in a three count criminal complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, maliciously attempting to damage and destroy by explosive, and attempting to provide material assistance to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). FBI and DHS are providing this information to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement and private sector security officials in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. All events described in this JIB are taken from the criminal complaint and other official documents. The charges contained in the indictment are mere allegations. As in any criminal case, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

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(U//FOUO) Kansas-Based Homegrown Violent Extremist Charged with Attempted Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction¹

(U//FOUO) On 13 December 2013, the FBI Wichita Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested Terry Loewen^{USPER} of Wichita, Kansas as part of a planned undercover law enforcement operation. Loewen was arrested after attempting to attack the Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT) and was charged in a three count criminal complaint with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, maliciously attempting to damage and destroy by explosive, and attempting to provide material assistance to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

(U//FOUO) Early on Friday, 13 December 2013, Loewen was taken into custody after he allegedly armed what he believed to be an explosive device and attempted to open a security access gate. While Loewen intended to detonate the device at the passenger terminal, there was no breach of ICT security and at no time was the safety of travelers or members of the public placed in jeopardy. Although the investigation is ongoing, no additional arrests are anticipated.

- (U//FOUO) In early Fall 2013, Loewen allegedly began preparations for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against commercial aircraft at the ICT. Loewen affirmed to an FBI undercover employee his commitment to martyr himself in the operation.
- (U//FOUO) During the investigation, Loewen allegedly engaged in, among other things, pre-operational surveillance, photographing gate access points, researching flight schedules, and assisting in the acquisition of VBIED components and construction of an explosive device.
- (U//FOUO) Loewen allegedly undertook some of this activity with the understanding that it was in support of AQAP, which was designated a foreign terrorist organization in January 2010 and unsuccessfully attempted to attack the United States in 2009, 2010, and 2012.

(U//FOUO) The FBI's investigation into Loewen was conducted with assistance from the Wichita Police Department, the Wichita Airport Authority, the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office, the Kansas Highway Patrol, the DHS Transportation Security Administration, and the United States Attorney's Office.

(U//FOUO) Outlook and Potential Indicators of Pre-Operational Activity

(U//FOUO) The alleged activities of Loewen highlight the continued interest of homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) in conducting terrorist attacks in the Homeland. We encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterparts to remain alert and to report potential indicators of pre-operational activity, including indicators reflecting possible efforts to manufacture homemade explosives. Although some of these

¹ (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define an HVE as a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.

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potential indicators may be constitutionally protected activities when conducted singularly and/or viewed in a vacuum, but they are not necessarily protected when conducted amidst other such innocuous-appearing activities. The presence of one or more might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparations for an attack, which is not constitutionally protected activity.

(U//FOUO) These potential indicators include:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual observation of, or unusual questions to, building maintenance or security personnel about security procedures;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual observation of security reaction drills or procedures or multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar venues;
- (U//FOUO) Discreet use of still cameras and video recorders, note taking, or use of sketching materials, that would raise suspicion in a reasonable person;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in entry points, peak days and hours of operation, security personnel, surveillance assets (including cameras), and access controls such as alarms, barriers, doors, gates, or locks;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual observations or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
- (U//FOUO) Acquisition of unusual quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that can be used to produce explosives such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
- (U//FOUO) Activities that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person that a storage facility is being used to construct an explosive device; and
- (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response

(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.

(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at FBI_CTAS@ic.fbi.gov or the I&A Production Branch by e-mail at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.5.3

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